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This article focuses on 4chan’s /b/ board, a—if not the—pillar of online trolling activity. 
In addition to chronicling the history of the site, as well as the emergence of the nebulous 
collective known as Anonymous, the article considers the ways in which early media 
representations of and subsequent reactions to trolling behaviors on /b/ helped create and 
sustain an increasingly influential subculture. Echoing Stanley Cohen’s analysis of moral 
panics, the article goes on to postulate that trolls and mainstream media outlets, 
specifically Fox News, are locked in a cybernetic feedback loop predicted upon 
spectacle; each camp amplifies and builds upon the other’s reactions, thus entering into 
an unintended but highly synergistic congress.    
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Harmless Monsters        
In her profile of 4chan’s infamous /b/ board, one of the Internet’s most active trolling 
hotspots, Fox News reporter Taryn Sauthoff walks a very fine line. “Some see 4chan as a 
site filled with bored teenagers who like to push the limits on what they can do online,” 
she writes. “Others see users as part of an ‘Internet Hate Machine’ filled with calls for 
domestic terrorists to bomb stadiums” (2009). As evidence of the latter claim, Sauthoff 
cites the board’s highly transgressive content and user-base, whom Sauthoof describes as 
antisocial and foul-mouthed. In support of the claim that 4chan users are little more than 
bored teenagers, Sauthoff plays up users’ social isolation, and marvels at their love of 
cute pictures of cats.     
2	
Using Fox News’ well-publicized “some people say” rhetorical technique, in 
which a reporter editorializes by proxy (“Outfoxed” 2008), Sauthoff thus manages to 
frame /b/ as a “surreptitious cultural powerhouse” populated by powerful misanthropes 
and an insignificant, “largely unknown” website filled with harmless, cat-loving 
computer geeks, a position she echoes in her profile of moot, 4chan’s founder, whom she 
describes in turn as wily king of the Internet’s underworld and hapless college dropout 
who lives with his mother (2009).   
Sauthoff’s take on 4chan is hardly unique. The vast majority of mainstream media 
accounts of 4chan, particularly the /b/board, simultaneously portray users as both 
threatening and pathetic. By maximizing audience antipathy—i.e. attacking whatever 
undesirable element from all possible angles, in Sauthoff’s case, users’ viciousness and 
implied effeminacy—the perceived (sub)cultural threat of 4chan is minimized, echoing 
Dick Hebdige’s account of ideological incorporation (1979). Indeed, in their hostility 
towards and dismissal of 4chan, best summarized by the seemingly counterintuitive 
statement that 4chan is nothing to worry about and should be destroyed immediately, 
mainstream media outlets aim to neutralize a particularly counter-hegemonic cultural 
space—an argument complicated and ironized by the role the media has played in 
4chan’s ascendency.      
The following paper explores this connection, and posits a much closer 
relationship between trolls and the mainstream media than either group might care to 
acknowledge. First, I discuss 4chan itself, particularly its /b/ or “random” board. In 
addition to profiling its resident trolls, I historicize the emergence of Anonymous as its 
hive-minded figurehead. I then consider how media outlets, specifically Fox News, 
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inadvertently engendered and sustained the very aberration they sought to contain, and 
provided scaffolding upon which further subcultural content could be layered. Finally, I 
consider the similarities between trolls and the outlets that feed them. As I will argue, 
trolling behaviors are homologous to mainstream media output, not diametrically 
opposed to; the motivations of each group might diverge, but their respective rhetorical 
strategies are often indistinguishable.   
Trailing the Hivemind 
As numerous scholars (boyd 2009; Ito 1997; Nakamura 2002, 2007; Schaap 2002) have 
stressed, so-called real life necessarily bleeds into online life, and vice versa. Our raced, 
classed and gendered bodies are encoded into our online behaviors, even when we’re 
pretending to be something above or beyond or below what we really are (Nakamura et 
al. 2000). In short, we cannot ignore the terrestrial when talking about the virtual. 
In the context of trolling, we cannot overlook the ways in which trolls’ raced, 
classed and gendered bodies undergird and provide context for trolling behaviors. This is 
not to say that there exists a simple one-to-one relationship between the people behind the 
trolls and their trolling personas. But at a very basic level, trolls’ terrestrial experiences—
levels of education, access to media and technology, political affiliation or lack thereof—
influence their online choices, including (and most basically) the ability to go online at 
all.   
That said, precise demographics are impossible to verify, particularly on 4chan/b/. 
Trolls on /b/ rarely if ever reveal identifying information, and are quick to shame or 
punish those who do, a fact that poses a number of practical ethnographic complications. 
It is impossible to know with any degree of certainty whether or not an anonymous troll 
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(variously described on 4chan as anons or /b/tards) would ever receive a specific 
message, if the respondent was in fact the intended troll, or if the troll was trolling in his 
or her answers, a point Gabriella Coleman addresses in her examination of cunning 
within trolling and hacking spaces (2011).  
In this way, research within the trollspace necessarily—though at times 
uncomfortably—echoes Tom Boellstorff’s Coming of Age in Second Life (2008), which 
eschews discussion of terrestrial identity in favor of close anthropological examination of 
one’s online identity. As danah boyd notes, Boellstorff’s analysis implicitly 
acknowledges the significance of the “real” self yet refuses to consider the ways in which 
one self informs and complicates the other; this, boyd argues, is highly problematic, and 
provides a limited account of a given set of behaviors (2008).  
I fully concede this point, and therefore am in full agreement with boyd. 
Consequently I have confined my research focus to what trolls do, and more importantly, 
how their behaviors fit within and emerge alongside dominant ideologies. Specifically, 
and drawing from over two thousand hours of participant observation on /b/, 
Encyclopedia Dramatica, Know Your Meme and YouTube, the following analysis 
chronicles the subcultural origins of trolling behaviors, and examines the ways in which 
these behaviors emerged from and evolved in ways structured by corporate media logic.  
The Internet Hate Machine  
4chan.org, a simple imageboard modeled after Japan’s wildly successful Futaba Channel, 
was founded in 2003 by then-15 year-old Christopher “moot” Poole. Currently the site 
houses dozens of content-specific boards, all of which cater to a particular subset of the 
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4chan population. The /a/ board, for example, is devoted to anime, the /x/ board to 
paranormal phenomena, the /v/ board to video games, and so on.  
The most popular board on 4chan—and the board to which I have restricted my 
focus—is /b/, the “random” board, which generates the bulk of 4chan’s traffic. Populated 
by tens of thousands of self-identifying trolls, users who revel in transgression and 
disruptiveness, /b/ is widely regarded as an epicenter (arguably the epicenter) of online 
trolling activity, and consistently pumps out some of the Internet’s most recognizable, not 
to mention offensive, viral content. As Matthias Schwartz explains in his 2008 profile of 
the site, “Measured in terms of depravity, insularity and traffic-driven turnover, the 
culture of /b/ has little precedent…[it] reads like the inside of a high-school bathroom 
stall, or an obscene telephone party line, or a blog with no posts and all comments filled 
with slang that you are too old to understand” (Schwartz 2008).  
Schwartz’ association of /b/ with X-rated latrinalia is particularly fitting, as 
content—much like its bathroom-stall equivalent—is almost always posted anonymously. 
Although users are given the option to populate the [Name] field, very few do, and even 
fewer provide identifying details (that is to say, actual names or names the poster intends 
to use more than once). As a result, the vast majority of content is created anonymously 
and modified anonymously and downloaded, re-modified and attributed anonymously. 
Users are thus known as “anon,” and the collective “Anonymous.”   
As previously discussed, this arrangement poses a number of demographic 
hurdles. Anons who identify as male could actually be female; anons who identify as 
female could actually be transgender; teenaged anons could say they are 35 and twenty-
somethings could claim to be underage. There is no way to empirically verify exactly 
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who is posting exactly what. It is however possible to identify a number of basic 
demographic indicators.  
First, almost all threads on /b/ are written in English and engage American culture 
and politics, with the exception of various appropriated Japanese references (i.e. 
Japanese-produced cartoons such as Pokemon and DragonBallZ, as well as a number of 
popular anime, including Azumanga Daioh and Gurren Lagann). Occasionally other 
languages and nationalities are represented, but the overwhelming percentage of anons 
identify as middle class sub/urban Americans.  
Secondly, it is likely that most posters fall somewhere between 18 and 30, an 
assumption based on the proliferation of late 80s and early 90s pop cultural references, 
including a flood of “you nostalgia, you lose” threads in which posters wax nostalgic 
over shared childhood memories. Although attachment to a certain vintage of TV, movies 
and toys doesn’t guarantee a particular age range, it does suggest a preoccupation with a 
particular moment in American pop-cultural history, a significant detail in itself.   
In addition to suggesting a particular age range and nationality, trolling behaviors 
on /b/ are strongly indicative of whiteness. Most obviously, trolling humor is frequently 
directed at people of color, particularly African Americans. Even when engaging in 
racially neutral humor, anons take their own whiteness, and the whiteness of their 
audience, for granted; on the rare occasion that an anon comes forward as non-white, he 
or she must self-identify, that is, flag him or herself as racially Other.  
Finally, although it is not possible to prove definitively that all /b/tards are 
biologically male, the ethos of /b/ is unquestionably androcentric. In addition to reveling 
in sexist tropes (“get back in the kitchen and make me a sammich”) and deriding posters 
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who come forward as female (the standard response being “tits or gtfo”), /b/ is home to a 
seemingly endless supply of pornographic material, all of which is filtered through an 
explicitly male gaze. But not necessarily a heterosexual male gaze; a large percentage of 
porn on /b/ is gay, and trolls devote a great deal of energy to ostensibly homosocial (if not 
outright homosexual) behavior, including frequent “rate my cawk” threads, in which 
anons post and rate pictures of each other’s penises. 
The prevalence of the word “fag” further complicates this picture. Whenever 
anons joke about “an hero,” a trolling term for suicide, wax poetic about drug use, or ask 
Anonymous for advice, the standard response is “do it faggot,” often accompanied by a 
picture of someone or something (cartoon characters, dogs, bears, children) bearing his or 
its teeth grotesquely. The accusation of “faggotry” is rampant, from second person claims 
that “your a faggot” to sophomoric discussions of “buttsecks.” And yet when asked to 
self-identify, whether in terms of geography of college or major or interest, anons 
automatically affix “fag” to the end of whatever self-reflexive noun. Thus novice posters 
are “newfags,” old hands are “oldfags,” people posting in California are “Califags,” 
posters claiming to be gay are “gayfags,” and so on.  Depending on the context, “-fag” 
can function as a homophobic slur, term of endearment, or neutral mode of self-
identification.  
In addition to scrambling precise demographics, anonymity has a profound 
behavioral impact. Most obviously, because there are no repercussions for posting racist, 
sexist, homophobic or exploitative text and/or images, and because trolling is 
characterized by transgressive one-upmanship, /b/ is overrun by highly offensive and 
sometimes explicitly illegal content, including child pornography. 4chan’s official policy 
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is that it has zero-tolerance for kiddie porn, and in 2008 moot claimed to have banned 
over 70,000 IP addresses (Brophy-Warren 2008). But the moderators can only work so 
fast, and can only oversee a certain percentage of threads. It is inevitable that even the 
most offensive content occasionally falls through the cracks.  
As shocking as some of the content on 4chan, and especially on /b/, might be, the 
site’s traffic stats are even more so. In July of 2008, Time reported that 4chan received 
8.5 million average daily page views and 3.3 million unique monthly visitors (Grossman 
2008a), and in August of that same year, the New York Times clocked 4chan’s monthly 
hit-rate (a metric which includes both unique and non-unique users) at 200 million 
(Schwartz 2008). A 2009 Washington Post article cited moot’s internal metrics at 
400,000 daily posts (Hesse 2009), a figure that had nearly doubled by 2010 (Fisher 
2010), and by March of 2010, the New York Times reported that the daily page view total 
had climbed to 800,000 and that the site boasts 8.2 million unique monthly visitors 
(Bilton 2010). Later that year, moot ran a ChartBeat data tag which tracked the total 
number of eyeballs on 4chan and discovered that the site is host to 60,000 overall users at 
any given moment and 10,000 on the front page of /b/ alone (“Mainstreaming the Web” 
2010). As a result, 4chan relies on five servers and processes the equivalent of twenty 
terabytes of data per day (FAQ 2010).    
How Did We Get Here?  
As previously mentioned, 4chan was created in 2003 by then-15 year old moot. It began 
as a content overflow site for a Something Awful sub-forum known as the “Anime Death 
Tentacle Rape Whorehouse.” moot was a regular contributor to ADTRW, and wanted to 
archive contributions by other SA users, known as “goons” (FAQ 2010). 4chan began 
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attracting users outside the intended sub-forum, and soon after its creation became a 
destination unto itself, complete with its own lexicon and behavioral norms.    
One of these norms was the appropriation of the term “troll.” Though many of 
4chan’s earliest users were affiliated with Something Awful, and would have self-
identified as goons, trolling became the nominative of choice on 4chan’s /b/ board. Most 
significantly, these early adaptors embraced a particular orientation towards their 
targets—lulz, a corruption of lol (“laugh out loud”). Like Schadenfreude, lulz emerge 
from the misfortune of others. Unlike Schadenfreude, which implies passive enjoyment 
of random misfortunes, the agent of lulz is either the direct source of the target’s 
misfortune, or at the very least is living vicariously through the responsible party.   
Although many of the trolls I’ve worked with insist that lulz is equal-opportunity 
laughter, the vast majority of lulz are derived from targeting people of color (especially 
African American), women, gay men and lesbians. This is not to say that historically 
dominant groups are impervious to lulz; Christians, Republicans, and white people 
generally have generated a great deal of trollish laughter. Trolls believe that nothing 
should be taken seriously, so they affect an aggressively oppositional and highly 
gendered stance whenever they encounter sentimentality or simply ideological rigidity—
an ideologically rigid assumption unto itself.    
With lulz acting as a behavioral anchor, trolling culture began to coalesce. By 
2006, and as an extension of their now-familiar hivemind rhetoric (“none of us is as cruel 
as all of us”), trolls on /b/ had adopted a collective anonymous identity. Specifically, the 
mass noun “Anonymous.” Unfortunately, it is impossible to know exactly when the 
adjectival form of anonymous gave rise to Anonymous as mass noun; Encyclopedia 
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Dramatica, a wiki devoted to all things troll and which contained user-generated entries 
dating back to 2004, was deleted by founder Sharrod DeGrippo in 2011. Although the 
front page of each entry was saved, the result of emergency intervention on the part of 
Web Ecology, all pre-2011 edits to the site were lost.   
Thanks to user-generated content on other sites, however, it is possible to estimate 
/b/’s subcultural timeline. In the case of Anonymous, and based on several Urban 
Dictionary entries which tag the term in relation to /b/ and 4chan, we know that the mass 
noun Anonymous was in circulation by 2006. These same entries also reveal that by 
2007, Anonymous had already spawned the Anonymous Credo (variously, “The Code of 
Anonymous”), which has since undergone a number of iterations but initially opened 
with the somewhat ironic claim that “We are Anonymous, and we do not forgive” (UD 
2007).  
At the time, Anonymous was personified by “greenman,” a well-dressed avatar 
whose face is obscured by the phrase “no photo available.” Rhetorically, this was no 
accident; from the very beginning, “Anonymous” was understood to be a loose collective 
animated by countless anonymous agents. When anons would refer to Anonymous’ 
exploits, they were thus referencing both the rhetorical power of the faceless collective as 
well as its behavioral effects.   
Initially, greenman was confined to on-site interactions. Trolls referenced 
Anonymous (and individual anons) on 4chan, and would use the moniker when 
contributing to off-site raid boards (i.e. staging areas for organized anonymous attacks), 
but rarely flashed this calling card in uninitiated circles. As the subculture grew, however, 
anons began crediting Anonymous on public forums, including Urban Dictionary and 
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YouTube. Still, through mid-2007, knowledge of and interest in Anonymous was mostly 
confined to participating anons. 
Then July 27th, Fox News aired its now-infamous “Report on Anonymous.” 
“They call themselves Anonymous,” anchor John Beard begins. “They are hackers on 
steroids, treating the web like a real-life video game…sacking websites and invading 
Myspace accounts, disrupting innocent peoples’ lives…and if you fight back, watch out.” 
Later in the clip, reporter Phil Shuman describes Anonymous as a “hacker gang” and 
“internet hate machine” hell-bent on destruction. “I’ve had seven different passwords and 
they’ve got ‘em all so far,” one interviewee alleges. “I believe they’re domestic 
terrorists,” insists another, a proclamation followed by stock-footage of an exploding 
service van.  
As Shuman explains, Anonymous is as merciless as it is clandestine. One woman, 
a mother, faced constant telephone harassment and was forced to get a dog; a boy named 
David was dumped by his girlfriend when hackers posted “gay sex pictures” to his 
Myspace wall; several sports stadiums received bomb threats, now thought to be a hoax. 
Later in the report, a former member of Anonymous—whose face and voice have been 
obscured, presumably for his own protection—accuses the alleged hacker gang of 
threatening to rape and kill him. In the following scene, the mother whose family was 
targeted, and whose identity is also obscured, pulls closed a pair of window curtains and 
offers a grim conclusion. “Would [the FBI] do something about it if one of us ended up 
dead?” she asks. “Probably” (“FOX 11” 2007). 
 Fox’s “Report on Anonymous” was posted to YouTube the same day the segment 
aired; to date, the clip has received nearly two million hits and has amassed over twenty 
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thousand viewer comments. A post made by DancingJesus94 captures the spirit of these 
responses: “Wow,” he or she writes. “Fox just fed the trolls, and did so in the lulziest way 
possible. I mean, what’s a bigger ego boost than for Anon to be branded dangerous 
criminals who can hack your computer by closing their eyes and merely thinking about 
it” (2010). This was, in other words, a windfall for Anonymous. As a consequence, the 
terms “hackers on steroids,” “hacker gangs,” and “the internet hate machine” were 
immediately integrated into the trolling lexicon, as was the image of the exploding 
service van, which was rechristened the 4chan party van and trotted out whenever law 
enforcement took interest in trolling raids (“getting v&” has since become shorthand for 
being arrested). 
Not only did 4chan receive an enormous PR boost from Fox’s coverage, trolls 
were outfitted with a sound branding strategy. Douglas Thomas describes a similar 
phenomenon in his study of hacker culture, particularly the “new school” hackers of the 
early 90s. As Thomas explains, “The media, as well as the public…learned to expect the 
worst from hackers, and as a result, hackers usually offer that image in return, even if 
their own exploits are no more than harmless pranks” (2002: 37). By framing 
Anonymous (and its constituent trolls) as socially deviant, Fox News had inadvertently 
provided trolls with a behavioral blueprint, along with the promise of further coverage for 
similar behaviors.  
Although Fox News didn’t create Anonymous, the Fox 11 News Report gave 
Anonymous a national platform, upon which trolls built larger and ever-more 
conspicuous structures. What once has been an underground site, known only to the few 
thousand active participants, had become a household name; “Anonymous” begin to 
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show up in mainstream media reports only after the Fox 11 News Report aired (“Internet 
Justice” 2007).  
Anonymous’ next major catalyst came in January of 2008, when Nick Denton at 
Gawker posted an embarrassing video of Tom Cruise lauding the Church of Scientology. 
Despite receiving a takedown notice from the Church, Denton refused to remove the 
video, citing it as “newsworthy” (Denton 2008); in response to the Church’s attempt to 
censor the video, some anon posted a comment to /b/ suggesting retribution (“Plan” 
2008). Thus began Project Chanology, Anonymous’ most ambitious project to date.    
Although Anonymous was hardly the first group to set its sights on Scientology 
(Coleman 2010), it proved to be the most successful. A week after Denton published the 
Cruise video, Anon released its now-iconic Message to Anonymous (“Message” 2008), 
and on February 10th, 2008, hundreds of protestors across the country gathered outside 
local Scientology centers. In order to maintain anonymity, participating anons wore 
plastic Guy Fawkes masks, a reference to what was then known on 4chan as “Epic Fail 
Guy,” a stick figure drawing indicating failure and disappointment—precisely the 
message anons hoped to convey about Church doctrine. Images of the protesters, 
particularly those wearing Guy Fawkes masks, dominated the news, and two days after 
the first protests, Anonymous was given its own Wikipedia entry.  
As Anonymous—and its mothership, the /b/ board—achieved greater cultural 
prominence, the media became ever shriller in their coverage. This in turn generated 
greater opportunity for lulz, which courted more media coverage, which engendered 
more original content, and even more media coverage. Fox News was the vanguard of 
sensationalism, with Bill O’Reilly leading the pack. After one anon hacked into Sarah 
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Palin’s Yahoo account, O’Reilly denounced 4chan as “one of those despicable, slimy, 
scummy websites” (Popkin 2008) and urged the FBI to take drastic measures (“Palin” 
2008; “Hackers” 2008).      
Anonymous took this opportunity to declare outright war on Fox News, 
particularly O’Reilly. After the Palin hack, trolls raided O’Reilly’s website and released 
users’, as well as O’Reilly’s, contact information (Danchev 2008). Similar tactics were 
deployed in response to one Talking Points/Confronting Evil segment in which O’Reilly 
claimed that “A far-left website known as ‘4chan’ is providing child pornography to 
internet pedophiles” (O’Reilly 2009).   
A year later, Anonymous initiated “Operation Bill Haz Cheezburgers,” yet 
another attempt to disrupt his website. Unlike previous raids, however, this was designed 
to kill with kindness. “Try not to send him anything R rated,” wrote the initiating anon. 
“That way when he rages on the air he’ll have zero ammo and everyone will look at him 
like he’s crazy for getting mad at kittens.” For the next few hours, Anonymous spammed 
O’Reilly with hundreds of incoherent laudatory messages, as well as pictures of bunnies, 
ducks and cats, many of which were captioned with the phrase “The Internet Love 
Machine.” At some point during the raid, someone reposted O’Reilly’s home address. 
Pineapple and pepperoni pizzas were subsequently sent, and one Anon photoshopped a 
screencap of O’Reilly’s face that read “What? I didn’t order any pizza. I don’t even like 
pineapples” (“Operation Bill Can Haz Cheezburgers” 2009).      
In short, Fox’s various responses to Anonymous, 4chan, and trolls generally 
helped fortify the borders of what at the time was a localized phenomenon but which 
soon emerged as a full-blown subculture. Not only did these stories augment the trolling 
15	
lexicon, that is, provide trolls with additional memetic material, they helped legitimize 
the development of a discrete, deliberate, and highly recognizable trolling identity. Put 
another way, and with Fox News leading the charge, trolls were given a framework upon 
which to build their public face. They happily set up camp, and thanks to an increasingly 
incensed mainstream media, were furnished with a constant supply of food. The 
framework proved expansive. Anonymous grew stronger, and the media vacillated 
between feeding and decrying its hideous progeny.  
Scientists of the Concrete  
The collusion between trolls and mainstream media outlets cultivates a set of behavioral 
and linguistic tropes, which in turn necessitate and sustain a distinctive trolling style. 
Necessitates because these tropes demarcate exactly who and exactly what qualifies as 
trolls/as trolling and maintains because they contextualize and reconfigure the meaning(s) 
of emergent behaviors and content—a process that lines up nicely with Dick Hebdige’s 
account of the development of subcultural style, particularly via bricolage. Described as 
the “science of the concrete” (1979: 103), the bricoleur is the scientist of the concrete; he 
gathers and reconfigures socially significant artifacts, then reanimates his creations with 
novel meaning(s).   
On 4chan, the “explosive junction” of otherwise-unrelated thing to otherwise-
unrelated thing (Hebdige 1979: 103) is accelerated by the material structures of 4chan 
itself. Specifically, 4chan is ephemeral; individual boards can only hold so much 
information before booting older data to make way for new content. As a result, few 
threads remain on the site for more than a few minutes, and those that make it to the front 
page typically disappear within the hour. Content does “stick,” however—if enough users 
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engage a particular piece of content, either through reposting or remixing, it will enter the 
subculture lexicon. It will become, in other words, a meme.       
The definition of the term meme is a source of some debate. Many theorists, 
including Henry Jenkins, insist that memetic theory, which is often described in terms of 
viral infection, posits a model of unwitting transmission and therefore undermines 
individual agency (2009). I am sympathetic to Jenkins’ concerns, and am similarly 
resistant to the assumption that audiences are little more than media “carriers,” i.e. 
passive vessels for corporate content. That said, within the context of trolling culture, 
“meme” carries a much more active connotation. For trolls, memes cohere within a 
holistic system of subcultural meaning; memes only make sense in relation to other 
memes. Users are expected to keep track of these shifting subcultural sands, making 
recognition and replication of specific memes and meme-families tantamount to keeping 
up with the Jones’ (or more appropriately to 4chan, with the Doe’s). Recognizing a 
meme, remixing a meme, referencing a meme—these actions establish a set of subculture 
borders, thus providing a “meaningful whole” to which additional signifiers may cohere 
(Hebdige 1979: 103, 113). Within the trollspace, these seemingly chaotic signs—whether 
expressed through language or artifacts—do something. In the context of trolling, they 
build worlds.  
Over 9000 Penises, a wildly successful and much celebrated ubermeme, illustrates 
the process by which subcultural worlds are built, providing a textbook example of the 
amplificatory relationship between trolls and the mainstream media. Not only does it 
illustrate how trollspaces are built, it highlights what kinds of worlds trolls are inclined to 
create. Trolls aren’t, after all, summoning content ex nihilo; they are cultural scavengers, 
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fashioning amusement from that which already exists. And more often than not, what 
already exists first passes through the mainstream media filter. The relationship between 
trolls and the media, then, isn’t just unsurprising, it’s close to definitional—forcing us to 
rethink our framing not just of trolls, but of the media itself.   
Our analysis begins with Pedobear, one of /b/’s most durable images. Based upon 
Japan’s “Safety Bear,” the image of whom would accompany anime deemed 
inappropriate for children, its American counterpart is a much more ambiguous figure 
(“Pedobear” 2011). Sometimes drooling, sometimes sweating, sometimes featuring a 
sombrero or the words “DO WANT,” Pedobear is always scrambling towards something. 
It is not until one realizes precisely what he is chasing after that his form takes on new 
significance—“Pedo” is short for “Pedophile,” making Pedobear the unofficial mascot of 
child pornography (“CP” in the trolling world). This is not to say that Pedobear 
represents real life interest in or support for child exploitation. More often than not, the 
image is used mockingly, as an implicit criticism of another anon’s apparent predilection 
for young girls, or in relation to some other meme, most notably the meme-cluster 
surrounding Dateline’s “To Catch a Predator” and its host Chris Hansen.  
The image of Pedobear sometimes does accompany CP, and sometimes does 
make light of, if not actively celebrate, sexualized images of children. Even this is a 
slippery territory, however, since CP is often deployed as trollbait against other trolls—
it’s one of the few things shocking enough to unsettle even the most jaded troll. 
Consequently, and despite the fact that posting CP onto 4chan is a permabannable offense 
(meaning that, if the site administrators encounter any CP, they isolate the poster’s 10-
digit IP address and permaban the offending anon), posting CP, or as is usually the case, 
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threatening to post CP, or making jokes about posting CP—which almost always appear 
alongside images of Pedobear—has become a meme in itself.  
We may now turn to the meme itself. Its first component is the phrase “over 
9000,” a nonsense numerical value taken from DragonBallZ, a popular manga series. 
Originally released in Japan in 1989, DragonBallZ premiered on American television in 
1996 and became a cultural touchstone for a generation of anime fans and gamers. In one 
episode, heroes Vegeta and Nappa prepare to fight a villain named Goku; they consult 
their “scouter,” a device that measures an opponent’s power level. Nappa asks Vegeta 
what the scouter says about levels, to which Vegeta growls, “It’s over nine 
THOUSAAAAANNND” and subsequently smashes the scouter in his hand (“9000!!” 
2006). Someone posted this clip onto /b/; perhaps due to nostalgia, perhaps due to the fact 
that “over 9000” was a mistranslation of “over 8000,” thus providing built-in 
conversation (not to mention trolling) fodder, perhaps due to moot’s subsequent 
implementation of a word filter that changed all instances of the number 7 to “Over 
9000,” Anonymous adopted “Over 9000” as the default answer to any question involving 
numerical value.    
The second component of the meme is much more straightforward. In September 
of 2008, some anon decided to troll Oprah’s message boards by posing as a pedophile. 
Oprah, who had spent the previous week lobbying for legislation designed to crack down 
on online predation, was made aware of the poster and decided to share what he had 
posted. “Let me read you something posted on our message boards,” she gravely began, 
“from somebody who claims to be a member of a known pedophile network: He said he 
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does not forgive. He does not forget. His group has over 9000 penises and they’re 
all…raping…children” (“Oprah OVER 9000 PENISES” 2008).  
Within the hour, a second anon downloaded Oprah’s warning, which 
unbeknownst to her featured an iteration of the Anonymous Credo, and spliced the clip 
into a music video featuring Pedobear, Oprah, the characters from DragonBallZ and 
Chris Hansen (“Pedobear remix” 2008). To the trolling community, this was a win on 
every front. In a 2008 edit of the Oprah Winfrey entry on Encyclopedia Dramatica, the 
corresponding video and transcript were accompanied by a photoshopped picture of 
Oprah sitting with a smug-looking monster. Pulling from the popular “[adjective] [noun] 
is [adjective]” meme, the picture is captioned with the phrase “Successful troll is 
successful” (2008).   
But why? What exactly was so successful about Over 9000 Penises? First of all, it 
is critical to address its transgressive appeal. Is no accident that trolls targeted this forum 
on this issue, nor is it insignificant that the resulting lulz continued long after the initial 
raid ended. Trolls would not have cared, or wouldn’t have cared as much, if the issue 
hadn’t been such a hot button for so many people. As it is, child exploitation, especially 
when sexual in nature, is one of the few taboos unaffected by political standpoint. As a 
result, whether deployed on 4chan or off-site, pedophilia (either threats of or references 
to) is one of the most exploitable tools in the trolls’ arsenal. That the “joke” made it all 
the way to the Oprah Winfrey show was profoundly amusing to participating trolls.   
Even more amusing was the its status as subcultural Trojan Horse. Simply by 
uttering the phrase “Over 9000 penises”—by uttering “Over 9000” anything—Oprah had 
marked the trolls’ territory. Anyone even remotely connected to 4chan (or online culture 
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generally) immediately knew that trolling had been afoot, and even better, that Oprah was 
a pawn in the trolls’ game. This in turn raised trolls’ online visibility, therefore lending 
even more infamy to an already infamous hivemind, and provided a catalyst for further 
memetic creation.  
Bricolage: Cycles of Amplification and Spectacle  
In addition to providing a textbook example of how trolls and the media feed into each 
other, as well as the ways in which media interventions generate further subcultural 
scaffolding, Over 9000 Penises reveals the rhetorical and behavioral similarities between 
trolling and corporate media. The most conspicuous of these similarities is the respective 
push for success.  For the trolls, Over 9000 Penises was successful because it harnessed 
and exploited a particularly sensitive cultural trope, and in the process generated a great 
deal of lulz. Trolls were not the only successful party, however; the success of the trolling 
raid hinged on the success of Oprah’s producers. The ends diverged somewhat, in that 
Oprah was courting a horrified yet sympathetic audience while trolls were merely 
courting a horrified audience, but the means by which these goals were achieved were in 
fact identical. Both trolls and Oprah’s production team tugged at the audience’s 
heartstrings, deployed emotionally loaded language, and exactingly exploited the human 
interest angle. Most significantly to this analysis, both had something to gain from their 
audience’s distress.  
The apparent overlap between trolls and Oprah’s producers is unsurprising. Trolls 
frequently engage in a complicated form of ideological shadow play with those they seek 
to exploit, particularly in their dealings with the mainstream media—lending new 
meaning to the term “outfoxed.” Like corporate media outlets, trolls go where the stories 
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are; like corporate media outlets, trolls revel in sensationalism and hyperbole. In short, 
both trolls and the media are invested in spectacle, the process through which business 
and entertainment fuse (Kellner 2003).  
Of course, what qualifies as “business” for one diverges from “business” as 
understood by the other. Most basically, the media is invested in the accrual of capital, 
while trolls are invested in the accrual of lulz. But in the service of achieving these stated 
goals—interestingly, the pursuit of lulz is explicitly described by trolls as being “serious 
business”—both camps must make as strong an impact as possible. They must engage an 
audience; they must ensure that people pay attention. The relationship between trolls and 
the media, in other words, is not diametric. Unlike the dynamic described by Gabriella 
Coleman in her fascinating analysis of the Church of Scientology and post-Chanology 
Anonymous, which argues that the ethos and tactics of the former is a direct inversion of 
the latter (2010), trolls and mainstream media are in fact homologous. Both camps 
engage in the same behaviors, for divergent ends.   
It is tempting to suggest that corporate media are vast institutions of trolling, or at 
least that individual media personalities are themselves trolls. This however would be a 
misnomer, since trolling, especially trolling associated with 4chan and early Anonymous, 
is predicated on subcultural identification. Trolls are people who act like trolls, and talk 
like trolls, and troll like trolls, because they’ve chosen to adopt that identity.  
I would however suggest that trolls have much more in common with the media, 
or perhaps more appropriately, that the media has more in common with trolls, than its 
corporate backers or viewers would care to admit. In terms of their engagement with 
media, and based on the marked similarities between trolling and sensationalist media 
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practices, I would argue that trolls jam the culture not by directly challenging the 
dominant culture, but by embodying the dominant culture, specifically by exploiting the 
very sensationalist imperative that keeps advertisement revenues high.     
In this sense, trolling echoes détournement as described by Guy Debord and Gil 
Wolman. According to Debord and Wolman, détournement, which can loosely be 
translated as “hijacking” or “rerouting,” occurs when cultural objects are 
recontextualized, thus imbuing a given artifact with newfound subversive meaning. 
Minor détournement is achieved when value-neutral artifacts are placed alongside each 
other, thus reconfiguring the meaning of each, while deceptive détournement 
subversively redeploys already-significant artifacts. The Colbert Report, which affects 
neoconservatism in order to undermine neoconservativism, is a prominent example of the 
latter, while a Photoshopped image of a cat riding a dog would be an example of the 
former.   
Whether minor or deceptive, both forms of détournement challenge or at the very 
least remix dominant ideals through creative and often absurdist appropriation (Debord 
and Wolman 1956). Most significantly for this study, artifacts may be détourned via 
pointed mimicry, the effect of which is to “reinforce the real meaning of an original 
element” (Jappe 1999: 59). In these cases, an artifact—a well-known quote from 
literature, a movie still or news clip—is placed in oppositional context and subsequently 
ironized, thus allowing the artifact to indict itself through itself.         
Trolling, which simultaneously mimics and mocks, which uses dominant tropes in 
order to disrupt dominant institutions, provides a textbook example of détournement. 
Trolls troll Fox News by acting like Fox News, and troll Oprah Winfrey by acting like 
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Oprah Winfrey, then howl with laughter when their chosen targets unwittingly rail 
against their own reflections. Whether or not trolls are motivated by political concerns, 
whether or not they intend to challenge dominant ideology, their behaviors détourn 
existing tropes, and therefore implicate their source—at least by proxy. Decrying trolls 
without considering their homologous relationship to mainstream culture, in this case the 
media that feeds them, is therefore comparable to denouncing the reflection but not the 
object reflected.      
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